Post-Verdict Acquittal—11th Circuit Court of Appeals

Typically, when an individual is acquitted of a crime in the District Court, he is a free man; the government typically cannot appeal the verdict,^[1] and cannot re-indict the individual on the same charges. The word “typically,” however, is crucial. As with most maxims, there are exceptions.

One of these exceptions is when a jury convicts an individual, but the District Court grants a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).^[2] This Rule states that a District Court judge may enter a judgment of acquittal on a motion which has been filed by the defendant within seven days after a guilty verdict. In United States v. Shepkaru, No. 05-13288 (11th Cir. 2005),^[3] the government appealed the District Court’s post-jury verdict of acquittal, as well as the District Court’s alternative granting of a motion for a new trial.^[4]

In this case, the defendant and 10 other individuals were indicted on conspiracy, wire fraud, extortion, and making false bills of lading charges.^[5] Ms. Shepkaru was convicted on the conspiracy charges but acquitted of all the other charges; subsequently, the District Court granted her motion for acquittal and motion for a new trial.^[6]

When the Court of Appeals reviews a grant of acquittal, it uses a de novo standard of review, and it will “give no deference to the district court’s decision.”^[7] Thus, the task of the Court is to “determine whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,”^[8] while viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the government, accepting the jury’s reasonable inferences and credibility determinations.”^[9]

The District Court in Shepkaru granted the acquittal on the conspiracy charge because, as the defendant stated, “there was no evidence of an express agreement between her and anyone else,” though she conceded that “circumstantial evidence may establish the existence of a conspiratorial agreement but only where the inferences are reasonable.”^[10] The Court of Appeals noted that the evidence established, “at a minimum, [that Ms.] Shepkaru would have been aware that customers’ bill had been increased and that some fraudulent scheme was afoot.”^[11] Thus, with that evidence, and with testimony of a co-conspirator, there was sufficient evidence “to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that [Ms.] Shepkaru knew of and participated in the scheme.”^[12]

All that evidence, however, was secondary to the main thrust of the Court of Appeals conclusion, which was that the District Court “was legally incorrect in finding that direct evidence of a conspiratorial agreement is required” in conspiracy prosecutions.^[13] A conspiratorial agreement can be proved with circumstantial evidence.^[14]

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[1] See United States v. Torkington, 874 F.3d 1441, 1444 (11th Cir. 1989).
[2] See United States v. Shelley, 405 F.3d 1195, 1200 (11th Cir. 2005).
[3] United States v. Shepkaru, No. 05-13288 (11th Cir. 2005)
[4] Id. at 2.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 4.
[7] Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2004).).
[8] Id. (citing United States v. Allen, 302 F.3d 1260, 1262 (11th Cir. 2002).).
[9] Id. (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,80 (1942) superseded by rule on other grounds, Bourjally v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).).
[10] Id. at 6.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 7.
[13] Id. at 10 (citing United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005).).
[14] Id. at 5, 10.