AEDPA Statute of Limitations—Lawrence v. Florida (SCOTUS Preview)

When the United States Supreme Court takes on the case of Lawrence v. Florida (05‑8820) in the upcoming term, it will have the opportunity to solve a split among states and federal circuits regarding the limited statutory rights of individuals to appeal a state death sentence.^[1]

The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was enacted in part to limit the appeal process available to death row inmates and render the execution of death sentences more “efficient.”^[2] In order to file a habeas petition from death row, an individual must show that a state court has “unreasonably” violated the individual’s constitutional rights in imposing the verdict and sentence. The appeal must be filed within one year unless extraordinary circumstances apply.^[3]

The AEDPA requires that the court does not count as untimely the period “during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review…is pending.”^[4] However, there has been confusion about whether that period begins with the adverse ruling from an appeals court or from the deadline to file for Supreme Court review.^[5] There is also a lack of uniformity in what circumstances qualify as “extraordinary” enough to equitably toll the filing limitation.^[6]

The odyssey of Mr. Lawrence’s appeal has taken him from Florida Supreme Court to the United States Supreme Court, out to federal court, and now back to the U.S. Supreme Court. Earlier this year, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held that not only had the period to timely file not tolled while the petition to the U.S. Supreme Court was pending, but that Mr. Lawrence’s mental deficiencies, coupled with ineffective assistance of counsel, did not constitute the type of “extraordinary circumstances “that are both beyond (petitioner’s) control and unavoidable even with diligence.”^[7]

Lawrence is the third case AEDPA to be heard this year. In Day v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 1675 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an 11th Circuit decision that dismissal is not automatic when the one‑year AEDPA deadline has passed. ^[8] Therefore, the court has the discretion to accept the case on its merits after hearing from both sides.

In Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 1491 (2006), the Supreme Court held that what constitutes a “reasonable delay” in filing is a matter of court discretion. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, did not find that Mr. Evans’ lack of access to the prison library for the purpose of preparing the appeal was “reasonable.”^[9]

Oral arguments in this case have not yet been scheduled, but will take place during the October‑November 2006 term.

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[1] Certification of the questions presented in Lawrence v. Florida (05‑8820), March 27, 2006 is available on the U.S. Supreme Court website. See also Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d. 1221 (11th Circuit 2005) [hereinafter Lawrence].
[2] Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA].
[3] Id. at § 2244(d)(1)(A).
[4] Id. at § 2244(d)(2).
[5] Lawrence supra note 1 at 5-6.
[6] AEDPA supra note 2 at § 2244(d)(1)(A) (The statute of limitations runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”).
[7] Lawrence supra note 1 at 11, citing Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
[8] Day v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 1675 (2006).
[9] Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 1491 (2006).