Brady Violation—“Material” Includes Impeachment Evidence

At the close of a term in which the United States Supreme Court seems to have lowered the bar for constitutional search and arrest rights to invisible, this week the Court issued an opinion that affirms the rights of defendants in a criminal court of law to have equal access to all exculpatory evidence.

In the per curiam decision announced Monday in Youngblood v. West Virginia (05‑6997), the Supreme Court held that all evidence that is “material” to the defense, including evidence that might be admitted solely for the purpose of impeachment (or rehabilitation) of a witness, must be provided to the defense.^[1]

In the case of Mr. Youngblood, who was convicted for sexual assault and sentenced to 25 to 60 years in prison in 2003, the Supreme Court agreed that the state had committed a Brady violation when it failed to provide the defense with a potentially exculpatory note written by one of the alleged victims.^[2] The Court reiterated that a Brady violation occurs “when the government fails to disclose evidence materially favorable to the accused.” ^[3] The West Virginia appeals court refused to consider the merits of the defendant’s claim, holding only that the trial court had not committed error in excluding the impeachment evidence from the exculpatory discovery rule.^[4]

The standard for materiality under the Brady rule is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”^[5] The remedy for a Brady violation is reversal upon a “showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”^[6]

With regard to the issue of whether or not the exculpatory evidence must reach the hands of the prosecutor before the state is held responsible under the rule, the Court reaffirmed that the prosecution has a “duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”^[7]

Noting that the rule of law is already settled in this area, the Supreme Court vacated the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision and remanded for proper consideration of Mr. Youngblood’s Brady claim.^[8] The majority stated that “[i]f this court is to reach the merits of this case, it would be better to have the benefit of the views of the full Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on the Brady issue.”^[9]

In his dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that it is improper to remand without finding error unless there has been an intervening change in the law, there is doubt as to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court to conduct a review on the merits, or the appeals court has admitted judicial error.^[10]

Justice Kennedy agreed that remand “simply for further explanation” was improper under the “grant, vacate, and remand (GVR)” standard announced in Lawrence v. Chapter (1996).^[11]

---

[1] Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. ____ (J. Scalia dissenting) (J. Kennedy dissenting) ((2006).
[2] Youngblood at 1.
[3] Youngblood at 3, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 87 (1963).
[4] Youngblood at2.
[5] Youngblood at 3, citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280 (1999).
[6] Youngblood at 3, citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 435 (1995).
[7] Youngblood at 3, citing Kyles at 437 (1995). See also U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 676 (1985).
[8] Youngblood at 4.
[9] Youngblood at 4.
[10] Youngblood at J. Scalia dissent 1-2.
[11] Youngblood at J. Kennedy dissent, citing Lawrence v. Chapter, 516 U. S. 163 (1996) (per curiam).